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On the basis of an ethnographic field study among artificial 
life researchers, this article proposes the concept of allusive 
machines to describe how technical systems variously allude 
people into shaping their own beliefs. The concept of allusive 
machines is inspired by previous research on persuasive 
technology, which defines technologies as instruments with 
the explicit purpose of changing human attitudes and 
behaviours, and the notion of theory machines, which refers 
to how objects in the world stimulate new theoretical 
formulations. We particularly introduce the concept of 
allusive machines to the analysis of how robot technology 
operates allusively to hatch new ideas and knowledge about 
life, for both designers in the laboratory as well as general 
publics during demonstrations. Focusing on Alter, an 
android based on artificial neuronal networks, we show how 
the concept of allusive machines is useful to rethink the 
relationship between designers and users analytically by 
showing how technical systems, like Alter, become allusive 
to human thinking and acting. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, we propose the concept of allusive machines to 
describe how technical systems – material apparatuses and 
computational things - allude people, in various ways, into 
fabricating and modifying their own beliefs. In more basic 
terms, the analytical device of allusive machines refers to 
specific technological assemblages, such as computers or 
robots, that work to allude people to think in new and 
innovative ways. We develop this concept on the basis of 
previous studies on persuasive technology [3, 10], which are 
often tethered to a concern about designing effective 
persuasive systems [3] by refining the manipulative tactics 
of persuasion itself [3, 22]. Moreover, previous research on 
persuasive technology has generally tended to target users as 
the subjects of persuasion, not the designers [3]. Inspired by 
persuasive technology, we here seek to think of allusive 
machines, as a concept that describes technical systems, 
which, during the design process, also modify the beliefs of 
its designers. However, to do so, we draw inspiration from 
the notion of theory machines, which refers to how objects 
in the world stimulate theoretical formulations [11], allowing 
us to reconfigure the one-way relationship between user and 
designer. By coupling insights from persuasive technology 
to the concept of theory machines, we unpack how technical 
systems thus operate diffractively - drawing in both designers 
and users - to allure, compel and entice them into fabricating 
new ideas, beliefs and convictions.  
With the introduction of allusive machines, we seek to offer 
an alternative reading of the intricacies of unwinding to 
which effect technical systems and technological forms 
operate to stir up and reshape people’s ideas, beliefs, 
attitudes, and behaviours. While the concept of persuasive 
technology inspires us, we simultaneously seek to reconsider 
the strong discourse on persuasion, often articulated as a 
deliberate act carried out by designers in direct relation to 
users. To a large extent, the discourse of persuasive 
technology hinges on the idea that persuasion can be 
subjected to a refractive logic, i.e. that persuasion occurs 
exclusively through a one-way relay between designer and 
user, often understood in a linear sequence. Besides inviting 
readers to discuss this discourse openly, we propose to read 
technologies as allusive, meaning that they work to call 
things to mind, which is to pass reference to new possibilities 
and fresh conceptions, allowing the subjects of allusion to be 
active in reshuffling different ideas and to form new idea 
sets.  
Essential to this process, we hold, are allusive machines, as 
those material things and technological assemblages we 
often encounter in lab settings or in everyday life, such as 
robots, computers, or even petri dishes - things that stir up 
our imaginations and modes of acting and thinking. We thus 
ground the concept of allusive machines on the idea that 
allusion signals a conjectural way of calling attention to or 
hinting at new spaces of possibility, motivating people to 
modify, change and reshuffle ideas, convictions, attitudes, 
beliefs or behaviours in indefinite and open-ended ways. 
Allusive machines incessantly pass and pit references 
between and against new propositions and existing forms of 
knowledge, drawing both designers and users into their 
allusive force fields, thus operating diffractively. They are 
diffractive in the sense that they allude both groups to 
reimagine, rethink, reconfigure and take action upon the 
advent of new possibilities. In short, allusive machines 
function both linearly and circularly in the sense that their 
allusive capabilities make fluctuations between new 
propositions and existing forms of knowledge,  reaching both 
 
  
users (general publics) and invert on the designers (artificial 
life researchers) themselves, calling attention to new habitual 
modes of acting upon and knowing the world.  
With reference to five months of ethnographic fieldwork 
among artificial life researchers at the Ikegami Lab, 
University of Tokyo, Japan, we provide an example of how 
allusive machines work to allude researchers and publics into 
rethinking what life is and how it works. We specifically 
inquire how robot technology - the android Alter - created by 
research teams at the University of Tokyo and Osaka 
University, operates as a concrete instantiation of an allusive 
machine. Alter is an upper-body android, based on artificial 
life principles, designed to explore relations between 
concepts such as control, free will, agency, life, body, mind, 
appearance and motion, to name only a few. But notably, to 
the research team at the University of Tokyo, Alter is also 
designed to query perennial questions about what constitutes 
life and under what conditions life might emerge. With Alter, 
as an embodied agent physically present in the real world – 
as opposed to the digital and virtual domains - they seek to 
stage an unexpected encounter with life in attempts to render 
life visible, audible, tangible, knowable and believable. In 
other words, they seek to make life available as a 
phenomenon apprehensible to the human qualia and human 
thinking, hoping to hatch new ideas about what life is. 
Taking our starting point in the laboratory setting, looking 
over the shoulders of those who seek to reconsider life 
through robot technology, we follow Alter from laboratory 
experiments into public demonstrations to describe how 
technical systems become allusive to the to the minds of 
designers and users alike.  
Unlike the personal computer or a tape recorder, Alter may 
be described as a somewhat strange and unfamiliar entity, 
occupying an unstable ontological domain, presenting itself 
as a rather abstruse case. Although in some aspects familiar, 
taking on a human form, Alter is an incarnation of artificial 
life, offering a counterpoint to nature and natural organisms 
made of flesh and blood, referencing itself as a probable 
embodiment of possible life. Upon encountering Alter, 
noticing its porcelain-white face and synthetic body, it 
alludes its observers (designers and users alike) to juxtapose 
and rethink what they already know exists in nature: living 
animals, plants, cells, genes, by referencing itself as a case of 
an inorganic and abiotic thing, a form of artificial life. In this 
way, observers are invited to experience an unexpected 
encounter with life, emerging between the known and the 
unknown, the familiar and the unfamiliar, shaping our 
perception of life as something more than the biological. 
While we may not always be persuaded or convinced, Alter, 
nonetheless alludes us into rethinking the category of life by 
reengaging with questions about what life is, what it might 
look like, what it might sound like, how it might feel like and 
so on. Unlike the tactics of persuasive technology, which 
often rely on the tools of social psychology, premised on a 
                                                        
1 B.J. Fogg also refers to persuasive technology as the field 
of “captology” 
one-way relay of communication between designer and user, 
allusive machines include the element of diffraction, which 
redistributes sensible, allusive gestures towards both parties, 
making designers and users alike active in rethinking 
conceptual categories, such as life, against what they know 
already. Alter is, to put it more bluntly, disruptive to our 
thinking.   
The paper is structured as follows: first, we review prior 
research on persuasive technology and the notion of theory 
machines to form a basis for the concept of allusive 
machines. Next, we introduce the concept of allusive 
machines in more detail. We then go on to describe the 
empirical setting and methods used during fieldwork, 
proceeding to provide two empirical examples showing how 
Alter works as an allusive machine, both in relation to its 
designers in the lab, but also in relation to the general public 
encountering it at a demonstration. Following from our 
empirical descriptions, we discuss how the concept of 
allusive machines offers a new capacious reading of 
technology, which we hope may open new research 
pathways for the future. In conclusion, the significance of 
allusive machines lies in the moment of the encounter, which 
summons the conditions of possibility for users and 
designers to rewire relations between the known and the 
unknown, producing a momentary space of novelty. Such 
characterisation, we think, broadens our understanding of the 
relations between humans, technology, materiality, 
persuasion, and allusion, during and after design. Thinking 
about technologies as diffractive and allusive, we hope, 
offers a modest reading of how both users and designers 
grasp, engage, perceive, use and interact with technologies 
as material vectors that do not necessarily persuade or 
convince, but rather allude and inspire our thinking.  
RELATED RESEARCH 
In recent years, technology has increasingly been harnessed 
in efforts to persuade people in various ways, both 
collectively and individually [14]. Under the headline of 
persuasive technology, which refers to a particular group of 
technologies that have the explicit purpose of changing 
human attitudes and behaviours [10, 9], technologies are now 
used to convey and apply principles and categories 
commonly found in social psychology (credibility, respect, 
trust, reciprocity, cooperation, authority and so on), in order 
to influence and/or manipulate people in positive and/or 
beneficial directions in terms of attitude, behaviour, 
motivation or intention [6, 10]. While we may speculate 
when exactly technology became persuasive, let alone what 
it means to persuade, it was not until the 1990s that 
persuasive technology was first articulated and discussed as 
a separate research field when B.J. Fogg [10] characterized 
computers designed to persuade as the 5th major wave in 
computing1 [10]. 
Nowadays, persuasive technology has come to encompass an 
entire range of technologies and technical artifacts, which 
  
include persuasive product designs, video games, computer 
programs, robotics, architectural designs, and so on [3, 12, 
13]. Conventionally, persuasive technology privileges and 
emphasizes the interactive qualities of technology, which in 
contrast to more “inert” technologies, such as present-day 
urban infrastructures (not including experiments with so-
called “smart cities”), enable user-sensitive and user-
adaptive responses, allowing persuasive messages to be 
directed towards the targeted user [15]. Concomitantly with 
the mass distribution of personal computers on a global scale, 
computers have commonly been considered to be ideal sites 
for conveying and enforcing persuasive messages, as well as 
dispatching intentions, exemplifying a type of interactive 
technology and design capable of generating specific 
behavioural results through the strategic deployment of 
friendly cues [4, 22]. The idea of persuasive technology 
seems to owe much of its existence to the enabling capacities 
of the personal computer itself, as they provide the backdrop 
and conditions of possibility to think of them as persuasive 
in the first place, perhaps themselves alluding us to believe 
that persuasion was originally conceived to reside in the 
domains of language, text and rhetoric? 
However, to qualify as persuasive, technologies may not be 
harnessed to use force, intimidation, coercion or 
misinformation to deceive, or delude target users [15]. Thus, 
the qualifying criteria for persuasive technologies designate 
only certain forms of technology and technical artefacts 
(ideally computers) that are mobilized to shape, reinforce, or 
change behaviours, feelings, or thoughts about an issue, 
object, or action [10]. This idea, we think, is rooted in the 
assumption that human behaviours and attitudes may be 
influenced and/or manipulated through technology, rhetoric 
and the theoretical nomenclature of social psychology. 
Therefore, to be genuinely persuasive, designers need to 
tailor their objects with the intentional purpose of 
manipulating end users toward a desired attitude or stance, 
strategically considering the event of persuasion to achieve 
the desired behaviour of the end user [3, 14]. This discourse 
hinges on a linear relation between designer and user, where 
the user is intended to change according to the intentions of 
the designer. Persuasive technologies are thus routinely 
imagined to be persuasive instruments, engineered and 
operationalized to convince and persuade their target groups 
in a sequential manner: designers design systems that in turn 
persuade target users. The efficacy of persuasive technology, 
then, is tethered to the idea that technologies and 
technological artifacts may act as means or mediums of 
persuasion to achieve certain objectives and goals upon an 
understanding that persuasion is amenable to be coded in a 
linear sequence. Needless to say, and unfortunately beyond 
the scope of this paper, imagining persuasive technology 
through this lens begs the question of ideology, power and 
interest (whose interests do persuasive technologies really 
serve?), as well as calling attention to the strained relations 
between governor and governed, manipulator and 
manipulated and so on.  
Yet, essential to proponents of persuasive technology is that 
persuasive sequences are reduced to the writing of code. In 
programming a persuasive sequence, one major challenge is 
the issue of timing, that is, how and when to deliver the 
persuasive message at the right time, at the right place, in the 
right way to gain full “impact”. Generally, three interrelated 
obstacles concern the issue of timing: the first is that the 
target user, who is subject to persuasion, has to be receptive 
to the end goal, i.e. susceptible to adopt the desired behaviour 
intended with the particular persuasive technology at hand. 
Second, the persuasive message, not the end goal, needs to 
be delivered at a time where the recipient is attentive towards 
it while remaining ready to take action upon it, if required 
[8]. Finally, variation may occur in the way persuasive 
requests are framed in the tension between the means and the 
end goals, that is, even though the goal may remain the same, 
the means to achieve it may differ substantially [3]. The 
timing issue, then, is essentially imagined to be a design 
problem curbing efforts to determine the right time, message, 
and approach, without necessarily knowing the specific 
contexts in which their target users are situated. Instead, as a 
design problem, designers can only anticipate the specifics 
of a social situation in which persuasive technologies are 
embedded. Some studies, however, have come up with 
solutions to the timing issue and emphasized the notion of 
adaptive persuasive systems: systems that calibrate and 
synchronize timing by drawing on the multiple types of 
information to attune to the specific situation of the target 
user [18, 17]. Adaptive persuasive systems, in other words, 
merely multiply and extend the efficacy of the original 
notion of persuasive technology by consolidating disparate 
sets of information to refine the persuasive sequences to be 
more precise. Albeit drawing on more sources, these systems 
are cast in the same linear trajectory that guides the thinking 
about persuasion, aiming at producing the same result to 
persuade target users. In sum, it runs in one direction: 
designers design adaptive persuasive systems that in turn 
persuade end users. 
A substantial body of literature has been produced on 
persuasive technologies that demonstrate the feasibility and 
efficacy of different technologies that become appended to 
the prefix “persuasive.” Previous empirical studies in 
Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) have shown how 
persuasive technologies work in various contexts, as well as 
for different purposes, scientifically and ideologically, for 
instance, in the promotion of healthy or pro-social 
behaviours [1, 5], in advancing efforts to reduce energy 
consumption [2, 3, 7, 23], in optimizing persuasuive features 
in robots [12, 13], or in warning people of the risks of being 
influenced by machines and artificially intelligent systems 
[24, 26]. Common to the study of persuasive technology, 
whether about pushing ideological agendas or refining the 
tactics of persuasion within the field of persuasive 
technology itself, is the notion that technologies themselves 
can be enlisted to become more persuasive than their human 
counterparts [10]. Further empirical investigations in HCI, to 
which persuasive technology most often adheres, have 
enforced the notion that humans tend to “anthropomorphize” 
technologies by interacting with, and responding to, them in 
similar ways as they do with other humans [10, 9]. Contrary 
  
to humans, these studies suggest, computers are experienced 
to be more persistent, always on, and sometimes even lifelike 
[9, 25], thus harbouring the potential power to become 
effective silver-tongues. What matters to persuasive 
technology is mainly how to exploit this.  
While persuasive technology is generally grounded in the 
idea that technologies may be exploited or taken advantage 
of to persuade users, the notion of theory machines [11] 
points to the idea that certain technological objects in the 
world stimulate new theoretical formulations. Whereas 
persuasive technologies work to incite desired behaviours, 
theory machines work to assist researchers (or designers) in 
their thinking, as tools of and for thinking. Theory machines, 
in other words, are epistemological auxiliaries built upon the 
idea that we find metaphysics in machines and machines in 
metaphysics, revealing that thinking and materiality are 
inextricably linked. Theory machines specifically refer to 
more or less concrete objects or machinations through which 
people become able to think between abstraction and 
concreteness. For instance, Albert Einstein used networks of 
electro-coordinated clocks at European railway stations to 
think about simultaneity, actively assisting him in 
formulating the theories of relativity [11]. In this particular 
case, the interconnectedness of somewhat concrete material 
objects, such as networks of electro-coordinated clocks, 
became essential to Einstein’s thinking and theorizing. Yet, 
we may still ponder whether such objects are are also 
generative of ideology or political agendas (or, as with 
persuasive technologies, simply objects in the world taken 
advantage of)? Nonetheless, theory machines have usually 
been described in terms of their enabling capacities as 
epistemological objects, not as objects for promoting specific 
creeds. From persuasive technology, we take on the premise 
that technologies carry capacities beyond their technical 
setup, simply the capacity to evoke images in people, but 
what we shall try to do here, however, is to think persuasive 
technology and theory machines together to explore how 
they might work to think of technologies as allusive, as 
material things that call attention to new ideas and certain 
modes thinking and acting.  
In what follows, we thus attempt to synthesize insights from 
persuasive technology with the idea of theory machines to 
constructively advance the idea that technological forms may 
operate to allude people to transform their modes of thinking. 
We, therefore, believe that the concept of allusive machines 
occupies a space between persuasive technology and theory 
machines, allowing us to think of technologies as things that 
may also work to allude us into thinking in new ways. The 
concept of allusive machines, we maintain, does not go 
against persuasive technology or theory machines, but is 
rather an alternative reading of technology, inspired by 
persuasive technology and theory machines.  
THE CONCEPT OF ALLUSIVE MACHINES 
As it might have become clear already, we hope to offer a 
revitalized and capacious reading of persuasive technology 
through the notion of theory machines. As such, allusive 
machines do not adhere or conform to the concepts and 
principles of social psychology or the discourse of persuasive 
technology itself. Instead, we seek inspiration in the term 
diffraction, borrowed from theoretical physics, which is a 
physical phenomenon by which a beam of light is spread out 
as a result of passing through a narrow aperture, typically 
followed by interference. We use the term in contrast to 
refraction, which denotes a linear process of deflecting light 
obliquely through an interface from one medium to another, 
on a one-to-one basis. While diffraction effectively disperses 
light in multiple directions, refraction only redirects it in one 
direction. Thinking about allusive machines through the 
concept of diffraction (perhaps ourselves using diffraction as 
a theory machine to think about allusive machines), we 
conceive of them as diffractive in two ways: 1) by embroiling 
more than users and 2) by incessantly passing and bridging 
references between new propositions and existing forms of 
knowledge, continuously working to create fresh ideas and 
new insights. To this end, allusive machines can be 
understood both literally and metaphorically, singly and 
collectively, as machines that diffractively generate alluding 
gestures towards users and designers, simultaneously 
reverting the refractive relationship between them.  
We take the concept of allusion itself as a device that calls 
attention to new possibilities through the work of reference. 
In other words, the making of an allusion is a conjectural way 
of calling attention to or hinting at new spaces of possibility 
that stir our imagination. We think of machines, both 
technically and metaphorically, as a device that converts 
energy into force or motion to perform particular tasks, both 
understood as those real tangible objects and machinations 
that physically exist in the world, engines, and as a metaphor 
for the assemblage of technical and non-technical things 
required for conveying allusive gestures. Allusive machines 
are affective and emodied, operating through hints, 
suggestions, and propositions that implicitly invoke 
references to new possibilities against forms of knowledge. 
The encounter with an allusive machine is the critical 
moment, whereby new propositions are invoked and 
juxtaposed with the existing forms of knowledge of those 
who are engaged in the encounter (i.e. those who encounter 
allusive machines in various ways: users, designers, etc.). In 
the encounter, allusive machines actuate and impel the 
juxtaposition between suspended forms of knowledge (what 
users and designers already know; for example, that life is a 
natural kind) and new propositions (that life is more than a 
natural kind, artificial life is viable). Thus, the encounter is a 
drawing together of new propositions and already existing 
forms of knowledge. Importantly, however, allusive 
machines drive us not to become aware of the falseness of 
our knowledge (that life is a natural kind), but of its partiality 
(that life is not exclusively a natural kind), constantly and 
incessantly displacing and rearranging what we thought we 
knew already. The encounter with allusive machines, we 
hold, may lead to a transformation of habits or practices upon 
the partially self-imposed realization that something new is 
possible or attainable (for instance that life is viable as 
something fabricated artificially outside the biological 
currents of natural reproduction and evolution).  
  
SETTING AND METHODS 
 
Figure 1: Alter, an upper-body android   
Our study was primarily conducted at the Ikegami Lab, 
which has been active in the field of artificial life for more 
than 15 years. Headed by professor Takashi Ikegami, the lab 
currently holds researchers of all stripes (professors, PhDs, 
postdocs, visiting scholars, graduate students, etc.) and 
backgrounds (phycisists, biologists, computer scientists), 
who collaborate infrequently across different research 
projects in all areas of artificial life: hard, soft and wet [20]. 
Having different academic backgrounds, all members work 
from their specific epistemic traditions but share a general 
interest in artificial life. As part of their practice, they pose 
various questions related to the study of life by engaging with 
the origins of life, open-ended evolution, complex systems, 
cognitive science, philosophy of mind, phenomenology, 
artificial neural networks, artificial intelligence, machine 
learning, art and more, to explore what life is, how it works, 
and how it is constituted. From an artificial life perspective, 
it is the only lab in Japan employing an all-encompassing 
mixture of art, philosophy, complex systems science, 
computer science, biology, chemistry, mathematics, physics, 
engineering and robotics in relation to the creation and 
understanding of life. But while their work encompasses and 
draws on many fields of research, including artistic 
conception, our main focus, for the purpose of this article, is 
how robots and androids are used as particular forms of 
hardware to explore life and its processes. Like computer 
simulations did in the 1990s, oil droplets and chemicals in 
the 2000s, androids now operate and perform as particular 
vectors for examining life up front in new tangible and 
affective ways.  
At the lab, members work on different projects related to the 
study of artificial life through exploring and analysing 
swarming behaviours, collective intelligence, open-ended 
evolution, and by training and embodying artificial neural 
networks. A few members, however, are dedicated to the 
exploration of life and life-likeness through robotics. On an 
everyday basis, these few dedicated researchers dabble with 
hardware, computational systems, and neuronal networks, in 
seeking new ways to construe life, drawing on artificial life’s 
constructionist tradition to fabricate the things they seek to 
understand [19-21]. The lab members, who are engaged with 
robotics, deploy various techniques from mechanical and 
electrical engineering, physics, mathematics, biology, 
biotechnology, complex systems science and computer 
science when conducting their research. While these 
researchers do many other things than dabbling with 
robotics, we focus here on their particular engagements with 
robotic media. Despite the fact that the Ikegami Lab is not 
technically a robotics lab, Ikegami and his team of 
researchers work somewhat parallel to official robotics labs 
across Japan in a concentrated effort to construct robots, 
based on artificial life principles, rooted in an ambition to 
transpose life into the real world, that is, to transfer life from 
the digital realm of computer simulations into the same 
physical, four-dimensional space of material and human 
bodies.  
On a general level, members at the lab design, develop, 
fabricate and experiment with all kinds of embodied agents, 
which include things like quasi-living protocells and the 
Mind Time Machine, to name only a few, and whose allusive 
capabilities are beyond the scope of this paper. Yet, while the 
lab works across all established branches of artificial life, it 
is the only lab in Japan that designs robots, such as Alter, 
upon what they call artificial life principles or Alife-based 
motivations, anticipating robot technologies as yet another 
propitious medium for exploring life. In their experiments 
with Alter, they wrangle with questions about how life might 
emerge, exploring what makes life and its processes tick, by 
situating and embedding Alter in complex and highly 
dynamic environments, i.e. in the real world. But they do so 
not only at their own lab at the University of Tokyo, but also 
at various sites across the city of Tokyo and Japan. In 
exposing Alter to volatile situations, members of the lab thus 
consider the orchestration of experiments and public 
demonstrations as dynamic infrastructures of complex 
human-nonhuman interactions to be studied in their own 
right. For them, exploring life is not just an analysis of 
Alter’s performance, but an exploration of the social 
complexities conjured in the encounters between humans 
and machines. They make no clear distinctions between 
research, experimentation and demonstration; the real world, 
they believe, is the laboratory, a material site to stage an 
unexpected encounter with life.  
Alter was conceived from a chance encounter between 
  
Takashi Ikegami (University of Tokyo) and Hiroshi Ishiguro 
(Osaka University), who, together with their respective 
research teams, designed Alter as an upper-body, lifelike 
android, capable of generating lively, spontaneous and 
unpredictable behaviours on its own. Initially, Ikegami and 
Ishiguro shared a mutual puzzlement about what would 
happen if top-down-inflected approaches of artificial 
intelligence (AI) converged on the bottom-up-inflected 
notion of artificial life. As a result, Alter came about, as an 
experimental testbed. Alter’s body is partially covered by 
patches of silicone skin – its arms and face covered - 
exposing some of its mechanical parts in between. It is 
deliberately designed to be neutral in the sense that it is 
supposed to appear ageless, genderless and uncultured; a 
tabula rasa artificial being to be apprehended in its own right, 
suggesting that it might belong to the machinic phylum [16] 
outside conventional biological taxonomy. As part of the 
overall physical design, Alter also has a voice expressed 
through its mouth in accordance with the volume of the base 
sound, scraping the frequency in responsive relation to its 
physical movements and bodily exercises. The basic idea is 
that Alter’s voice is generated in real time in accordance with 
its movements and informational inputs, meaning that it is 
not remote-controlled or programmed to exhibit any 
particular goal-oriented behaviour.  
Technically, Alter is powered by two air compressors and 
receives sensory information from its surroundings through 
an adjacent autonomous sensor system. The sensor system is 
based on artificial chemistry principles, which is coupled to 
two internally autonomous dynamic systems: a central 
pattern generator and a neural network. The sensory system 
itself is comprised of multiple sensor units encased in 
transparent boxes in front of Alter itself, actively providing 
Alter with visual, sonic, thermal and haptic inputs. When 
information is received by one or more of the sensor units, 
they mutually share and transmit that sensory information 
between one another. This shared cluster of information is 
transmitted to the central pattern generator and the neural 
network, actively processing and transducing the “chaotic 
dynamics” of the environment, condensed in its local milieu, 
to spontaneously create rhythms (like an internal 
metronome) generating motion. The neural network then 
makes variations of action, perturbing the central pattern 
generator, which is then put in locomotion to create the 
spontaneous and unpredictable movements and ambient 
voice of Alter.  
Methods 
We primarily refer to five months of ethnographic fieldwork 
among researchers at the Ikegami Lab, University of Tokyo, 
Japan, and secondarily to studies carried out at the Ishiguro 
Lab, Osaka University, Japan. Over the course of five 
months, we have collected various types of empirical data 
extracted through participant observation, field observations, 
written sources, scientific articles, and interviews. Our 
methodology has generally involved participation in 
everyday activities among researchers actively working in 
both labs, including thorough readings of written materials, 
produced by the Ikegami Lab and the Ishiguro Lab, with 
relevance to our specified object of study.  
However, we primarily focus on the Ikegami Lab, where we 
have participated in everyday activities and conversations, 
attending lab seminars, workshops, and experiments. 
Although we turn attention to Alter, as our specific object of 
study in this paper and the collaborative project between the 
University of Tokyo (Ikegami Lab) and Osaka University 
(Ishiguro Lab), the android was at the time of our study based 
in Tokyo, which prompted us to stress ethnographic focus on 
the Ikegami Lab. From Tokyo, the Ikegami Lab is 
responsible for conducting hands-on experiments with Alter, 
as well as being responsible for organizing public 
demonstrations and exhibitions at various locations around 
Japan. The bulk of our data stems from the Ikegami Lab. 
Fieldwork was, however, frequently extended to Osaka to 
interview key persons at the Ishiguro Lab, who have at some 
point participated in the Alter-project. From February 2017 
to June 2017, we consistently conducted 20 audio-recorded 
interviews, and 2 non-recorded interviews, both semi-
structured and structured, in Tokyo (19) and Osaka (3), 
organized and participated in 4 workshops in both Tokyo (2) 
and Osaka (2) (Tokyo workshops in collaboration with the 
Department of General Systems Science, University of 
Tokyo, and Osaka workshops in collaboration with the 
Department of Anthropology, Osaka University), which 
includes field observations at both locations. Underpinning 
our empirical data, we have collected various documents, 
texts, and scientific articles produced by key researchers 
working in both Tokyo and Osaka to contextualize and 
support our empirical findings.  
ALTER AS AN ALLUSIVE MACHINE 
In the following sections, we refer to two specific empirical 
instances in which Alter comes to operate as an allusive 
machine. While we recognize that these instances may be 
thought together, as Ikegami and his peers do not necessarily 
distinguish between research, experimentation, and 
demonstration, we, for the sake of convenience, make two 
separate sections. First, we show how Alter works to allude 
Ikegami and his team into thinking about life as emergent 
patterns of complex phenomena, meaning that life 
potentially emerges through human-machine interactions, 
during lab experiments. In the following instance, we show 
how Alter works to allude publics into reflecting on the 
viability of artificial life during a public event in the city of 
Tokyo. Even though both instances can be conceived as 
experiments – or rather allusive moments - we specifially 
want to emphasize how the particular encounters between 
Alter and its human audiences (artificial life researchers and 
publics) reveal how people are generally alluded into 
rethinking what they thought they already knew about life, 
yet without any positive assurance that their observations, 
ideas and interpretations are exhaustive, correct or definitive.  
  
Alter in the lab 
 
Figure 2: Alter during design activities in the lab 
 
As guests of the Ikegami Lab, we were invited to participate 
in experiments on Alter, most often conducted at the 
National Museum of Emerging Science and Innovation (The 
Miraikan). These experiments, we suggest, reveal moments 
where technologies (in this case Alter) become allusive in 
enabling the designers (in this case artificial life researchers) 
to think about life and vitality without any positive assurance 
that their observations and interpretations are exhaustive. 
More precisely, we provide an example of how Alter is one 
particular instance of an allusive machine that alludes these 
artificial life researchers into rethinking life as an emerging 
pattern of complex phenomena, as something potentially 
emerging through human-machine, rather than biological 
structures and organic forms, exactly by referencing itself 
towards the unknown, a space of new possibilities.  
To our naked senses, Alter generates strange and 
unpredictable behaviours. Its fingers twitch, its eyes flicker 
spasmodically, its voice electronic. Its synthetic body 
signalizes, pantomimes, gesticulates, blinks, dances, sings, 
charms, appeals, and, we propose, alludes to us in a tactile 
way. Alter generates smooth, sometimes jerky, yet beguiling 
movements and sounds, emulating apparitions of liveliness, 
which fill the featureless hall, where its designers flutter over 
wires and cables, tacking back and forth between laptops, air 
compressors, sensor units, lunch wrap and empty plastic 
bottles. In this spectacle, Alter adjusts to its moving 
surroundings, attuning its body to ours, phonemically 
reacting to our blubbering, adapting according to the heat of 
our bodies. From immersing ourselves in these experiments, 
it became clear to us that Alter was more than a visual, 
auditory and sensible spectacle.  
As we observed how the lab members would hover around 
Alter, making gestures, blocking its sensors with their feet, 
positioning themselves relative to its body, they were 
anticipating its reactions to adjust their programming 
accordingly. Each adjustment was tried and tested to explore 
changes in its movement and behaviour. Most of the time 
during experiments, the designers were suspended in travel 
between Alter and their laptops, looped into Alter’s internal 
systems, shuttling back and forth between Alter, its sensors, 
and their laptops. In between, they would briefly instruct 
each other to move to different locations in front of Alter’s 
sensors, before returning to work on their laptops. From our 
observations, and through talking to the designers, we found 
that this “dance” made Alter into an object for thinking about 
life by anticipating and reacting to changes in its behaviour, 
based on adjusting sensor sensitivities, numerical values, and 
so on. Particularly, it became clear that Alter served to 
ground their thinking about life, both during experiments and 
more generally, by becoming a reference to life, not as a form 
or a structure, but through observing its moving body as an 
animated display of life-likeness, a pattern of complex 
phenomena, as something potentially emerging through their 
tweaking interactions with Alter itself. In turn, this pattern, 
brought about by Alter’s spontaneous and unpredictable 
movements, could potentially be discerned to suggest that 
life is relationally constituted through the entangled 
movements of human and machinic bodies. The point is that 
Alter alludes to new ways of thinking about life that are not 
necessarily right or wrong, but rather speculative, as 
Ikegami, who would sometimes participate in the 
experiments, notes:    
[…] Maybe life exists in the communication between human 
beings and Alter … I mean, the way they communicate? But 
life is not in Alter, and it’s not in human beings, but it’s in 
between. That is what some people say. Sometimes I think 
this is right, but at other times, there still seems to be 
something that’s missing.  
Here, as Ikegami reports, they think across Alter to speculate 
whether life might be a relational phenomenon in the sense 
that it emerges in between machines and human beings. 
However, what matters here, we think, is not that Alter 
persuades them into determining what life is and how it 
works, but how it alludes to possible ways of experiencing 
and perceiving life and its processes. It was not that Alter 
was a form of material proof or evidence that would persuade 
them into thinking that life could take hold outside organic 
substrates, but instead that it could act as a technological 
object that would allude them into thinking about life and its 
boundaries against the biological frameworks, in which it is 
  
usually arrested. Instead, by interacting with Alter, they 
would set themselves up for an unexpected encounter in the 
face of the unknown: 
I don’t want to describe what life is by saying “ok, this is the 
concept to understand life”, these are the equations for living 
systems, or this is the material you put into the system to 
make it alive. I think life is more about processes. 
To think of life as processes, organic or even inorganic, is 
not uncommon in the field of artificial life, biology or 
computer science [19, 21]. However, what Ikegami bespeaks 
here is also a conception that life cannot simply reside within 
forms, structures or embodied bits of vitality, for instance 
such as the soft tissues of animal species or molecular 
structures. Neither, he and his team of researchers believe, 
can life be sufficiently conveyed through chemical formulas, 
mathematical equations, or computer simulations, which 
have often been heralded as more or less accurate models of 
life and lifelike processes, exhibiting novel forms of vitality 
[20]. Rather, by setting themselves up to be voluntarily taken 
by surprise by Alter, they enable themselves to reimagine 
and rethink what life could perhaps be about. But process to 
Ikegami also refers to how we encounter technologies, as he 
asks what happens in such encounters: 
[in the encounter] you want to pick up as many meaningful 
side effects as possible. For example, the side effect of 
building and firing a rocket is the amazing view of it. At the 
start, it’s “let’s build a rocket!” but after it’s done, the 
question: “what did you see?” becomes much more 
meaningful. I always prioritize the latter, but on the other 
hand, it’s almost impossible to predict what is going to 
happen.  
In grappling with Alter during experiments, Ikegami and his 
team seem not only to juxtapose what they already know 
about life, as a natural kind, against the alluring suggestions 
of Alter, referencing itself as a possible case of life, but they 
also seek to trace these so-called side effects. However, 
Alter, as mentioned before, is not material proof or evidence 
of artificial life as such, something designed to denounce 
biology, but rather a material entity that alludes Ikegami and 
his team to categorically include technology, data, 
information, bits, bytes, and robotics into the domain of the 
life. While Alter allows them to reconsider what life is 
through the nomenclature of cybernetics, information, and 
robotics, against the backdrop of biology, DNA, cells and 
genes, they hope to discover the emergence of new patterns, 
new modes of aliveness that are not premised on established 
biological schemes. Thinking of life, through bodies, as 
processes, patterns, and flows of information, surfacing from 
human-machine interactions and bodily movements, we 
think, is the side-effect that allows them to think of life as 
something in excess of the biological, breaching its 
boundaries previously established by biology. Importantly, 
however, they believe so without any positive assurance that 
their ideas and interpretations are exhaustive.  
By virtue of being strange and unknown to them, Alter 
alludes them into rewiring relations between life, the 
biological and the artificial, calling to their attention new 
possibilities for thinking about life as ever-evolving patterns. 
Alter, as an allusive machine, offers to them, not a 
counterpoint but a technolgical extension to biological life 
and evolution, referencing itself as a probable embodiment 
of possible life, without denouncing that life is also a natural 
kind. Alter alludes them to think in the interstices between 
the known and the unknown, the familiar and the unfamiliar, 
the natural and the artificial, human and machine, shaping 
their perception of life as something more than the 
biological. 
Alter performing to the Public  
Outside the lab, this strand of thinking is protracted, when 
Alter is presented to the public. In the public arena, Alter 
operates to allude people into reflecting on the universality 
of life and what it means to be alive. Specifically, during 
public demonstrations, Alter works to motivate belief in the 
fidelity of artificial life to “real” life through the spectacle of 
the demonstration itself. During our fieldwork, we had the 
chance to attend a public demonstration to experience an 
encounter between Alter and a group of tech-enthusiasts, 
journalists, reporters, bloggers, artists, and photographers. 
We specifically attended a public demonstration held at the 
Intercommunication Centre (ICC) in Shinjuku, Tokyo, 
where Alter featured as one of the main attractions. Here, the 
crowd had assembled to experience up front the android that 
was allegedly endowed with life.  
In the large conference room, Alter was, however, visibly 
hidden from the anticipating crowd, who had been seated in 
front of the stage to listen to Ikegami, who would do a 
presentation from a couple of slides projected onto a large 
screen behind him. During the panel talk, Ikegami presented 
his general thoughts about the Alter-project, to which he 
appended that the primary intention with Alter was to 
minimize the appearance aspect instead to explore and 
convey life merely through motion and sound. From the 
stage, Ikegami shuffled through his slides, depicting details 
about the technical specifications of Alter, while he spoke 
over them: Alter is composed of 42 pneumatic actuators and 
has a face of indeterminate age and gender, a face that could 
be anyone’s, its neural network, he went on, modelled on the 
neural circuitry of the human brain, and so on. The crowd 
patiently listened to Ikegami, who circulated the question:  
Why do machines that differ from living organisms in both 
their mechanisms and purpose of existence seem more 
lifelike at times than some organisms?  
After his inaugurating talk, photographers were quietly 
guided to a set of cardboard walls, behind which Alter stood 
silently waiting to be revealed. The lights in the conference 
room were turned off leaving the crowd’s murmur in all-
encompassing darkness. As Alter’s “singing” began to 
resound, the cardboard walls were pushed aside to reveal 
Alter standing on a small elevation with its air-compressors 
concealed in the back room. Frequently lit up by the 
momentary flashes of cameras, Alter’s body moved 
smoothly through the dark, attuning to the audio levels 
  
within the room, to produce fluent movement patterns, 
seemingly dancing to the vibrations of the crowd’s murmur 
and the snapping sounds of the cameras. To the audiences’ 
wonder, camera flashes and bodily gestures, Alter itself 
generated not only autonomous movements but “sang” with 
a voice of its own. While the illuminated red LED’s, 
mounted on its open panel in its scalp and joints seemed to 
move freely in the air, drawing illuminated lines upon the 
dark canvas, the room thickened with tranquil ambient music 
when Alter intensified its singing to its audience. To the 
audience, Alter was presented as an entity capable of moving 
and speaking on its own behalf, itself showing how life might 
look otherwise, as something conveyed through a non-
carbon-based set of mechanisms, i.e. code. The encounter 
between Alter and the audience brings about an awareness of 
life, as something that might possibly be attained in artificial 
bodies, however, based on code rather than molecules. In 
turn, the encounter propelled the imaginations of the 
audience to become apprehensive to the (animistic) idea that 
(artificial) life is attainable as a technological property, and 
not merely as a biological property. In other words, Alter 
alluringly attested to the idea that life was something 
technologically attainable, not by falsifying previous notions 
of biological life, but by reminding audiences of the partiality 
of this proposition itself. Alter was itself expressive of this 
capacious conception of life, gesturing towards new habitual 
modes of acting upon and knowing the world through the 
aperture of new possibilities, once again alluding to the 
notion that life is something more than biology.  
However, with reference to the underlying philosophy 
underpinning Alter, and the ways by which Ikegami kept 
articulating Alter during the show, it was clear that Alter’s 
affect was also an effect of this. In other words, although 
Alter seemed to be itself bespeaking the possibility of life as 
consistent with robotic technology, this could not be 
disassociated from Ikegami’s articulations and trained 
readings of Alter, its background and history, its actions and 
purposes, resulting from their experiments with artificial life 
in general. In short, the words of Ikegami worked to 
accompany the very materiality and performance of Alter, 
embedding the audience solidly within the conceptual and 
interpretive framework of artificial life, consolidated and 
transmitted through the panel talk and Alter’s stage 
performance. As such, Alter’s physical presence and 
performance, coupled with Ikegami’s words spoke directly 
across the boundaries of possibility, embodying Ikegami’s 
own notion that artificial life is larger than biological life. 
Yet this, we hold, would not work without the presence of 
Alter. Recalling Ikegami’s notion: 
Alter and artificial life systems can amplify society in order 
to notice that there is a frame, and then go beyond that frame.  
The encounter at ICC, we suggest, became a concrete 
materialization of going beyond frames in terms of thinking. 
Yet, it was not the case that Alter was staged intentionally to 
persuade audiences deliberately through the tactics of 
persuasion [22], but rather that this encounter between Alter 
and audiences spoke latently and allusively to the possibility 
that robots, and non-organic systems, might be rendered fully 
alive in the near future. Indeed, what made the demonstration 
of Alter fascinating to the crowd, we suggest, was a sense 
that Ikegami was not fully in control: Alter was, as Ikegami 
also noted, designed to generate spontaneous and self-
generated movements and sounds from sensory inputs 
provided through its immediate surroundings. This made its 
behaviour seem realistic and purposeful, as it drew its life 
force from its environment, perhaps even intentionally. The 
allusive force conjured by Ikegami’s presentation and Alter’s 
performance not only extend the idea of allusive machines to 
include more than materiality, but was visually and audibly 
overwhelming to the crowd, who were stimulated to think 
about what life is and what it means to be alive. Alter 
profoundly activated the imagination of the participants to 
reflect on new possibilities and new modes of co-existence 
with artificial life systems and robots. And with reference to 
Ikegami’s overall vision, the demonstration reminded the 
audience that technologies, like Alter, could make us think 
in new ways, to become aware of our own human biases and 
prejudices towards each other and living technologies, as 
well as reminding us how artificial life might change society. 
To use Ikegami’s own words, the audience was amplified to 
go beyond what they thought they knew already by inviting 
them to re-evaluate their conception of technology.  
 




Not quite aligning to the tenets of persuasive technology and 
the notion of theory machines [11], Alter, as an allusive 
machine, seems to allude both users and designers. In the 
examples provided in this paper, Alter alluringly bespeaks 
the possibility of artificial life in various ways, suggesting 
that artificial life researchers are not necessarily strategic, 
with defined behavioural outcomes in mind [22], but rather 
explorative and speculative, with unpredictable behavioural 
outcomes in mind. Their aim is not to arrive at an absolute 
definition of life, or to persuade themselves and others to 
conform to certain desires or agendas, as prescribed by 
technology, but to be suspended in relays of allusion. 
Likewise, the audience encountering Alter at public 
demonstrations are perhaps hardly persuaded, but instead 
alluded to think of life beyond its biological moorings, to 
think of life in terms of technology, code, and androids.  
We do not contest the proposition that persuasion is a 
technological disposition, but we diverge from the strong 
discourse articulating persuasion as a calculated and 
deliberate act carried out by designers in direct relation to 
users. The concept of allusive machines, we hope, offers a 
fresh capacious reading of technology, which might open 
new research pathways for the future. But more importantly, 
as we have tried to show, technologies may not always be 
thought of as persuasive but may be thought of as simply 
stirring our imaginations, in turn, potentially affording us to 
become more innovative and creative. Perhaps far-fetched, 
this paper itself may potentially be viewed as an allusive 
machine in the form of text, alluding us into reopening 
questions whether persuasion always entails deliberation and 
intention? How persuasion and allusion are conceptually 
distinguishable from various mechanisms of power, 
authority, or coercion? (for instance, by what means we can 
tell the difference between, say, persuasion, allusion, 
cajolery, seduction or coercion?), or whether we can find 
instances in which people are unknowingly or unwillingly 
being persuaded against their will? And if so, how do we 
discern and recognize the ethics of persuasive technology 
rather than celebrate its power? Finally, is persuasion 
measurable? We do not think that the concept of allusive 
machines necessarily sidesteps these problems, but perhaps 
it is useful to open new research trajectories that trace and 
reconsider the multiple ways to think about technologies.  
CONCLUSION  
In this paper, we have introduced the concept of allusive 
machines to describe technical forms, which allude people in 
various ways into shaping their ideas and beliefs without any 
positive assurance that their convictions are exhaustive. 
Inspired by persuasive technology and the notion of theory 
machines, we have proposed to think of technologies as 
allusive, arguing that allusive machines diffractively enable 
both users and designers to critically engage with new 
propositions on the backdrop of what they already know. 
When encountered, allusive machines make fluctuations 
between new propositions and existing forms of knowledge, 
in turn gesturing towards new horizons of possibility, calling 
attention to new habitual modes of acting upon and knowing 
the world.  
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